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In this paper we investigate the reasoning powers or  proof theoretic powers of 
various established temporal ogics used in Computer Science. In Sections 1-6 we 
concentrate on provability of various program properties while in Sections 7-9 we 
investigate provability of temporal formulas in general. In Sections 1-6 we consider 
both deterministic and nondeterministic programs. 
Our investigations are ~wofoid: 
(1) compare the reasoning powers of the various logics, and 
(2) characterize their reasoning powers. 
The investigations in (2) are often called completeness i sues, because a good 
characterization amounts to finding a nice and mathematically transparent semantics 
for which our logic is complete (cf. e.g. [4] and [19]). In doing (2), we follow the 
methodology called Correspondence Theory in philosophical logic (see [19, Chap. 
II.4]) which was first elaborated for temporal logics of programs in the 1978 version 
of Sain's [43] (cf. also [10] and [21]; both [43] and [10] were based on the Computer 
Science temporal logics in [6]), in the framework called time oriented Nonstandard 
Logics of Programs (NLP). The same is used in [1-4]. In particular, the semantics 
denoted as "~-o P(...) '" by Abadi was first introduced as " ( lnd+ Tord)~'" in the 
above quoted NLP literature (cf. e.g. the historical notes in [38, 42, 21, 49]), and 
will also play a central role here. Among others, we will obtain new strong 
(hereditarily in a sense) incompleteness results w.r.t, this semantics for proof systems 
of [5] and [33]. No number of new axioms, but a single new modality can eliminate 
this incompleteness ( ee [40]). 
In Section 8 we solve some of the problems raised in recent publications of the 
famous temporal ogic school represented by Manna and Pnueli [33, 34], Abadi 
and Manna [5], and Abadi [ 1-4]. These problems concern the strongest among the 
inference systems designed so far for computer science oriented first-order temp',ral 
logics. Here we consider only inference systems which are (at least theoretically) 
relevant i'or machine implementation. 
* This work has been supported by the Hungarian National Foundation for Scientific Research Grant 
No. 1810. A shortened version oJ this paper appeared as [il] 
0304-3975/91/S03.50 © 1991--Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. 
126 H. Andr~ka et al. 
Besides containing several new results with proofs (most of these are in Section 
8), the paper also has an overview character. Therefore it also contains several 
results (some new, some not) without proofs, but with information about the status 
of the proofs. 
!. Time oriented NLP and the first characterization result 
We use the adjective "'time oriented" to distinguish the approach of the present 
paper from approaches to NLP (Nonstandard Logics of Programs) taken, e.g. in 
[ 15, 16, 29, 32, 38]. On the other hand, we want co indicate that the present approach 
is based on explicit notion of time. Time oriented NLP is a three-sorted classical 
first-order logic, the sores of which are the time scale 7, the data domain D, and a 
sort I consisting of some functions from T into D. We think of the elements of ! 
as time sequences, i.e. sequences indexed by the elements of E in more detail, a 
model of time oriented NLP is a triple .,1t = (T, D, I) where T = (T, 0, suc, <~, +, x) 
is called the time structure of all, D is the data structure (or data domain) of d~, and 
It_ rD ( rD denotes the set of all functions from T into D.) The intuition comes 
from the standard models ((to, O, suc, <~, +, ×), D, '°D) of NLP, where to is the set of 
all natural numbers, and the elements of I are indeed oJ-sequences. For our purposes, 
however, the arbitrary models like d /above  are more important than the standard 
ones .  
Let p be a (possibly nondeterministic) blockdiagram program using only one 
variable x. For y ~ ! we say that y is an execution sequence of p if the sequence 
(y(O),y(suc(O)) . . . . .  y(t)  . . . .  ) , r  is an execution of p in the usual sense. Now a 
partial correctness assertion (pca), {~(x)}p{~(x)} is valid in ~ if[ for every execution 
sequence y~ ! of p, whenever ~(y(0)) holds in D and y(t)  is a terminating state 
(or possible output) of p, then we also have that ~(y(t) )  holds. The case when p 
uses more variables is similar. (Total correctness and other kinds of statements 
about programs are formalized in time oriented NLP similarly, cf. Section 5.) 
The formulas of time oriented NLP are (basically) the usual three-sorted first-order 
formulas of the language of d4. Let Ax be a set of such formulas of time oriented 
NLP. Then 
Ax ~ {~0]p{~,] 
is defined to hold iff {~p}p{~b} is valid in every model d /o f  Ax. We say that {~}p{ds} 
follows from Ax (in time oriented NLP) if[ Ax ~ {~p}p{~} holds. 
A characterization of a fixed program verification method, say ~VH, consists of 
finding a set Ax of (first-order) formulas of the many-sorted language of time 
oriented NLP, and proving that the correctness of a program is provable by F-FH iff 
it follows from Ax in time oriented NLP. An example for such a characterization f  
FIoyd-Hoare method ~_F. is the theorem saying that a pca is FIoyd-Hoare provable 
iff it follows from the axiom system ind,1 of time oriented NLP (see [17, 51]). lndql 
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is a restricted T-induction. More precisely, let us recall that the time scale T has a 
distinguished element 0e  T and a nexttime function or successor suc : T -* T. Now, 
for any formula ~(z)  of  t ime oriented NLP, the full induction schema Ind postulates 
(¢(0)  ^  (VzE T ) [¢ (z )  --~ ¢(suc(z)) ] )  -+ (Vz ~ r )¢ (z ) .  
Note that in this lnd, ~p may speak about the whole of  ~/L and not only T, and may 
contain parameters from any sort of  J//. So our lnd is much stronger than the usual 
one in which ¢ is al lowed to talk about the structure T only. Now, Ind~1 c lnd 
postulates induction for exactly those formulas ¢(z )  of  time oriented NLP which 
contain no quantifiers of  sort T. The above ment ioned characterization of  the 
F loyd-Hoare  method (t -FH) in the notational system of  the present paper reads as 
I - ' FH  --~-~[~ lndq~. (1.1) 
This formula abbreviates the claim that for any pca {~}p{~} we have 
I -FH {~p}p{~b} <=~ ind,, ~ {~}p{~b}. 
We will return to the nondeterminist ic and concurrent cases in Section 6 way below. ~ 
All the results here carry over to the nondeterminist ic and concurrent cases under 
the assumption of  the existence of  a clock in the sense of  [1-4] or Section 6 here. 
References [10, 21, 31, 36, 46, 47, 51, 52] contain further information on time 
oriented NLP  as well as on its connection with Temporal  Logic and with other 
computer  science logics. 
2. Temporal logics of programs and further characterizations 
We will use a first-order mult imodal (actually temporal)  logic with five modalit ies 
(~), O ,  l-q, [F ] ,  and [P].  We call them "First", "Next" ,  "'Always", "'Always-in-the- 
future",  and "'Always-in-the-past'" respectively. The duals of  F-q, [ F] ,  [ P] are denoted 
by O, (F),  (P), and called "" Sometime", "Sometime-in-the-future", and"' Sometime-in- 
the-past" respectively.-" 
A nonlogical symbol is called +flexible as opposed to rigid i f  it is al lowed to change 
in t ime)  Unless otherwise specified, the only flexible symbols we allow are constants 
Y, Yo, Y~,- . .  ,Y,~,.. . -  However,  in s'~me of  our results we will also allow flexible 
i The first version of the characterization ~Fv __ tndq r was proved in 1977 by Andr~ka nd N~meti 
(cf. [8]) under the assumption that the data theory is strong enough for coding finite sequences by 
elements, insymbols (~_FH __-- ind~ t )/(mo'iulo Peano's axioms for data ); cf. Section 3 for an explanation 
of the assumption on the data theory. This assumption was eliminated by Csirmaz, who also generalized 
the result o nondeterministic programs [ 17], and obtained some very strong improvements of this result 
jointly with Paris [18]. Some of his proofs were simplified by Sain (cf. [51, 46]). 
2 We use here Goldblan's notation for Always, Always-in.the.future, and Always-in-the-past, see [22. 
Section 6, pp. 39-40]. 
3 The terminology rigid-flexible comes from philosophical logic (cf. e.g. [19, pp. 254-317] and the 
above quoted papers of Abadi and Manna on computer science temporal logics). Some computer science 
works [21, 28] use the words "+global" and "'local" for "'rigid" and "'flexible" respectively. 
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predicates etc. Throughout, y~ and xl denote flexible constants and rigid variables 
respectively. First-order quantifiers can be applied only to rigid variables (x~). Rigid 
variables (xi) range over the data domain D. In a three-sorted model ~ff introduced 
for time oriented NLP in Section 1, y denotes a function y~ c I mapping T into 
D t~ =(T, D, !)), so y#(t)  denotes the value of  the flexible constant y at time t. 
Now, for a unary relation symbol R, R(y) is true at t iff R(y-u(t)) holds in D. The 
intuitive meaning of  @,p is that ~ is true at the first time instant. 4 Using our 
three-sorted models ~,  @q, says that ~ is true at time 0. Similarly, for t ~ T, C)~0 is 
true at r iff ¢, is true at suc(t). [~o is true at t i f f  for all t, ~ T, @ is true at t,. [F]~, 
is true at t i f f  for all tt E T with t, I> t, @ is true at t,. [P]~, is true at t i/t for all 
t, ~< t, q, is true at t,. . /4 ~ ~o for a temporal formula @ iff ~o is true at every t ~ T. 
2.1. Axiomatization of temporal logic 
Consider axioms (AI, A2) and rules (A3-AS) below. 
(A1) For any propositional temporal schema 0 valid in the standard models 
(co,...), all (first-order) instances of 0 belong to (AI). 
Remark. It is known that (AI)  is decidable, and many finite axiomatizations are 
available for (A!), cf. e.g. [20, 22]. 
(A2) consists of all temporal formulas valid in every model ./~ of time oriented 
NLP. 
Remark. (A2) can be replaced with the Hilbert-style axioms: {(@ <-* n~,) for every 
modality [] (i.e. Q~{@,O,[],[F],[P]}) if ~0 contains no flexible symbols; 
(Vx []~0 ~ []Vx ~0) for every modality 1":1; ~0 -~ @(x/l') for any term ~" such that the 
substitution x~-, ~- does not create new bound occurrences of variables or new 
occurrences of  flexible symbols in the scope of  modalities in ~o; all (temporal 
instances of  all) axiom schemata of the axiomatization i [25, p. 157] of classical 
first-order logic (other axiomatizations work too, but one has to avoid possible 
substitution rules)}, 
(A3) {~o, (p ---) 0} ~ 0, 
(A4) @ ,- Vx ~p, p ,- []@ for every [] ~ {~, O ,  rq, IF ] ,  [P]}, 
(AS) {®~, ~ --, O,p})-- ~. 
Note that by (A1-A4) we can derive (or "simulate") (A5). In spite of  this 
redundancy, we will need (AS) too because we will work with fragments of our 
temporal logic. 
4 Our modality ® might look unorthodox. However, it is expressible in the temporal logics in [41, 
35, 30], namely ®~ is equivalent with (F)(P)(¢ ^ -'1® TRUE) or equivalently (F)(P)(¢ ^ eFALSE). 
Here "'(F)(P)'" expresses O,and ~ is strong, while e is weak "'previously". A similar emark applies to 
the temporal logic LinDisc in [22. p. 64]. Similarly, in any temporal logic to which Exercise 6.7 (p. 44) 
of [22] applies, the above used (F) and e are expressible, hence ~) is so. The modality (~ is usually 
denoted by J (for "'jetzt") in the literature, see e.g. [19, Section !1.2.4.10, pp. 121-1241 and [26]. 
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Derivability with (A1-AS) is denoted by ~-sFp, derivability with (AI-AS) in the 
fragment not containing [P] is ~-sF, same in fragment not containing either [P] 
or [F] is ~-s, and same in fragment containing @ and C) only is ~-o. Note that 
~-s, ~-s~, ~--SFe are frequently used established temporal ogics. Throughout, by 
"~-s-fragment" or "'language of ~-s" we understand the set of formulas containing 
@, C), and [] only. Similarly for ~-o, ~-sF, ~-sFe (e.g. the ~-o-fragment consists of all 
formulas containing no modalities but @ and C)). 
In temporal logic, symbols denoting elements of sort I of a model ~ are treated 
as constant symbols. Variables ranging over I are not allowed. If y e I and x e D 
then the temporal fo-mula y = x is true at time t c Tiff  y( t )= x. If p is a program 
then Ax(p) is the temporal logic formula expressing that y is an execution sequence 
of p (i.e. y is a time sequence of values of the variable x of the program p). For 
example if i~ ...... 2, 12 is an edge (or command) of p then Ax(p) contains the 
subformula ("at I~") ~ 3x(x  = y ^  C)(y = x + 2 ^  "at/2")). 
Now, a temporal proof of a partial correctness assertion {~,}p{0} is a proof of the 
temporal formula y expressing 
("y is at the halt label of p"--* O(Y)), 
from Ax(p) and @¢(y), using one of the inference systems ~-o, ~s, ~sF, or ~s~,,. 
The formulas */, Ax(p), and @¢(y) belong to the fragment ~-o (i.e. they do not 
contain modalities bat @ and C), cf. e.g. [41]). We write ~-s{~'}P{0} for 
{Ax(p), ®q,(y)} ~-~ y and similarly for the other inference systems ~-o, ~-s~ etc. 
Theorem 2.1 (Sain). ~r .  = I-o. That is, exactly those pca's are provable by the 
Floyd-Hoare method which are provable by the logic ~-o. This result also extends to 
nondeterministic programs. 
Outline of proof. The proof is based on Theorem 9 il: [10], Corollary 2.1 in [51], 
and on [ 17]. These references provide proofs for item (1.1) in Section 1. Therefore 
it is enough to prove that a pca is provable in ~-o iff it is valid in every model of 
Indqf. This can be proved analogously to the characterization f~-sF proved in [52], 
as well as in [49], but the present proof is easier. Actually, in proving the completeness 
direction, one uses (1.1), and observes that any ~-FH-derivation uses rigid formulas 
only, therefore is easily translatable to a ~-o-derivation. The soundness direction 
egnsists of showing that the axioms and rules of ~-o are valid in models of lnd,~. 
Only the induction rule needs thinking. Using the translation of temporal formulas 
to NLP formulas given in [52] or [49], one checks that the formulas to which ~-o 
applies induction, translate to ones ~ot containing time quantifiers. Therefore Indqy 
will imply all the (translated) instances of the induction rule of b-o. [] 
Theorem 2.2. None of the extensions ~-o ~'~ t-s ~0" t--SF ~ ~-SFP is conservative; Le. there 
are formulas ~Oo, ¢p~, ~o2 in the fragment of  ~o such that ~o 9o but ~-s ¢~o, t~s 9, but 
t - s~o I etc. 
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On the proof. The last statement (~-s~-~ -sFJ,) follows from Theorem 6.1(ii). The 
proofs of the remaining two statements can be found in [52]. [] 
our  first group of characterizations of  program verifying powers (the first one is 
due to Csirmaz [16], the last two to Sain 1981-82) is as follows. 
Theorem 2.3 
I--FH ~E Indqf 
~s ~ lnd 
~-s~ -~E ( lnd + Tord) -~  ~-s~p. 
Here Tord stands for "Time is linearly ordered", it is the time oriented NLP axiom 
generating the full first-order theory Th((~o, O, sac, <~)) of the standard structure 
(~o, O, sac, <-) for the time sort (or time scale) T of our models ~.  
The proofs of these statements can be found in [52]. Concerning the proof of  the 
first statement, see also footnote 1. 
Corollary 2A. ~-sF "~ (~-sFP expanded with "' Until" and "Since"). 
Corollary 2.4 can be even further generalized to obtain ~-sF ---D ~--ANY, where 
~-ANY is the temporal ogic with modalities based on discrete linear ordering on 
time and containing ~-sF. This follows from the fact that having the Tord axiom in 
Theorem 2.3, one can describe all possible temporal modalities based on discrete 
linear ordering of time. 
3. Comparing program verifying powers 
From the point of view of proving progr*~ properties, ~-s and ~-sF are the same 
as the established program verification methods known as Intermittent Assertions 
Method (or Sometime Method) and Pnueli's temporal method, respectively. 
Already from the point of view of proving deterministicpca's only, the FIoyd-Hoare 
method is strictly weaker than ~-s which is strictly weaker than ~-sF ---D ~-sFp which 
in turn is strictly weaker than some new methods to be introduced and discussed 
in Section 4. 
Theorem 3.1. I -FH <D t-s <E~ t-SF <El (certain new methods) where e.g. ~_FH <E] I--S 
means that strictly more deterministic pca's are provable by t--s than by ~_~H (Le. i f  
=--~ was defined as (<~[] and >~) then <~ would be (<~Q and not ~>rJ))- 
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For the proof and more careful form,dation of the third inequality the reader is 
referred to Theorem 4.1. The remaining (first two) inequa'Aties follow from theorems 
in [52] or [49]. 
At this point we note that the symbols ---~ and <~ are applicable between any 
formalisms ~-~ and v- 2 which are suitable for pro~ing pca's. So Harel's axiomatization 
of dynamic logic or any other logic of programs can take the place of t-, in t--, -=~ t- 2 
or i-~ <~ t- 2. (We note that, unless otherwise specified, -=E: and <D are defined with 
our attention restricted to deterministic programs.) 
In connection with the differences in proof theoretic (or program verifying) power 
discussed so far, the following question of practical relevance comes up: "What 
happens if the data domain D is rich enough to encode Eaite sequences with single 
elements?" More precisely, what we assume is that the data theory (or specification) 
forces the data domain to be such. Examples for such "rich" data theories are 
Peano's arithmetic, the specification of LISP, finite (or arbitrary) set theory with or 
without urelements. The answer to this question is that if the data theory ensures 
codabdity of  finite sequences then the Floyd-Hoare method ~_FH becomes as strong 
as Pnueli's ~-sFP which in turn remains still strictly weaker than the new methods 
mentioned above. In symbols we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.2 
\ / /  modulo Peano's \ 
I - ' -FH d E (certain new methods) | / |  . . . . .  I .  
~-~ ~-s -[] ~-sFP / l \ antnmetzc Jor aata /
This theorem is proved in detail in [50], but the equivalences follow from [8] or 
[10], while the inequality follows from Theorem 4.1. 
Theorem 5.1(iv) of [50, p. 312] contains more information on the "<~ (certain 
new methods)" part above, and Theorem 5.1 (vi) in [50] is the total correctness version 
of  the above theorem. 
At this point a further characterization result can be presented. Namely let ~ HAREL 
be the inference system of (standard) Dynamic Logic as presented in [24] and also 
in Definition 10 of [45, p. 493]. 
Theorem 3.3 
\ / /  modulo Peano ' s \ I'-HAREL ~'~(Z f o r  Time) lnd + Peano" s arithmetic 
) / t arithmetic for data,) 
This follows from [24, Theorem 5] together with Theorem 5.1(v) of [50, p. 312]. 
Actually [24, Theorem 5] gives a more general characterization of ~_HAREL, tOO, 
namely w.r.t, all statements of programs expressible in standard Dynamic Logic. 
Instead of recalling that characterization i full detail, we mention that it uses, 
besides ( lnd+ Tord), a restricted form of Ex defined in Section 4 together with 
three-sorted induction on data (i.e. the same as Ind but for D instead of T) which 
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is sometimes called structural induction (cf. DIAg in Section 5). We note that full 
Ex would be too strong. We will return to this in Section 4. 
4. Program verification methods strictly stronger than Pnueli's temporal 
logics of programs 
Using NLP, it is easy to construct program verification methods trictly stronger 
than Pnueli's temporal logics of programs. Some of  these strong methods have been 
defined in terms of (usual) temporal logics, too (see [ 11 ]). An example for a program 
the partial correctness of which is provable by such a strong method but not provable 
by Pnueli's method is a program verifier for LISPprograms. A more mundane xample 
is a proof checker for theorems about LISP or about Peano's arithmetic. Some of 
these new methods remain strictly stronger than Pnueli's one even if the data theory 
ensures codability of finite sequences (e.g. if it contains Peano's arithmetic). 
In more detail, (lnd + Tpa + Ex) is a set of axioms in the three-sorted first-order 
language of time oriented NLP: Ex, "existence a_xioms", postulates the existence 
of those elements of I which are definable by first-order three-sorted formulas. In 
traditional logic Ex is usually called comprehension schema (see [ 13, Section D.4.5, 
p. 937]). More concretely, if.~[ =(T, D, I) and ~p(z, x) is a formula (in the first-order 
ianguage of 2/) with 21 ~ (Vz ~ T)(::lx~ D)~p(z, x) then Ex postulates the existence 
of a y ~ I with 2 /~ (Vz ~ T),p(z, y(z)). Further, Tpa abbreviates "Peano's axioms 
for the time scale T expanded with + and x". (Note that "'Peano's axioms for the 
data domain D", in short. "Peano's arithmetic for data", is disjoint from Tpa since 
it speaks about a different sort of ~. )  
Theorem 4.1 (Sain 1983). (a) ~svP <G ( lnd + Tpa) <~ ( Ind + Tpa + Ex), and 
(b) ((Ind+ Tpa)<[](Ind+ Tpa+Ex))/(moduloPeano'sarithmeticfordata). 
One concludes that ( lnd + Tpa + Ex ) is strictly stronger than the strongest proof 
system T, studied in [1-4] because theorems therein state that ~-T2 <~D (lnd + Tpa). 
Outline of proof. Let us consider a theorem prover program p deriving consequences 
from Peano's axioms. Now, our pca says that p will never derive the formula x # x. 
If we wanted a FIoyd-Hoare proof for this pca, we would be looking for an *'inductive 
assertion" X- For our present pca, a natural inductive assertion is the following: 
First we fix a model say A of Peano's arithmetic, and then X says that the formula 
derived by p in the actual (or "present") step is valid in our fixed model A. This X 
will be true in the zeroth step (since A ~ Peano's axioms) and if X is true at time 
t ~ T then it will be easily seen to be true at t + 1. Therefore by induction, this X 
would be suitable for proving our pca. 
However, this X is not expressible in the language of our data domain, moreover 
it is not even expressible in (lnd + Tpa +"Peano's axioms for data"), because of 
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Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth. Intuitively, the reason for this is 
that expressing X assumes defining a model, say A, but A is an essentially infinite 
object, while the elements of our data domain are essentially finite. Even the elements 
of the models of ( lnd + Tpa +"Peano's axioms for data") are "'internally" finite, 
i.e. logically they behave like finite objects. Since (lnd + Tpa + "'Peano's axioms for 
data") ensures the existence of these finite objects only, we cannot define (any 
element hat would be big enough to code) A in the framework of this theory. 
Tarski's theorem adds that this limitation cannot be sidestepped by some "clever 
trick". This inability of expressing X leads to unprovability of our pea in ( lnd + Tpa + 
"'Peano's axioms for data"), hence it is also unprovab!e in ~-sFe. We will retnrn to 
this unprovability a little bit later. 
Our main point here is that X is expressible in ( lnd+ Tpa+Ex)  because Ex 
ensures the availability of infinite objects, from which we can construct models. 
Namely, the functions y ~ I, mapping T into D can be used as characteristic functions 
of subsets of T. These subsets can be infinite even "internally" (e.g. the set of odd 
elements of T is easily codable by a y : T--, D and it is an infinite set from all 
possible points of view). Therefore, Ex enables us to construct (or "code") a model 
of Peano's arithmetic from elements of I, to prove that this model indeed exists and 
satisfies Peano's axioms etc. In short, X is expressible in ( Ind+ Tpa+Ex)  and 
therefore our pca is provable. The details are worked out both for provability from 
( lnd + Tpa + Ex) and for unprovability from ( Ind + Tpa + "Peano' s axioms for 
data") in [49, Section V.I]. 
Concerning unprovability from ( lnd + Tpa + "Peano" s axioms for data"), a proof 
of our pca from this theory would imply provability of the consistency of Peano's 
arithmetic from ( lnd + Tpa +"Peano's axioms for data"). However, this theory is 
equiconsistent with Peano's arithmetic (an easy exercise), hence the assumption 
( lnd + Tpa + " Peano "s axioms for data") ~- (our pca ) would imply provability of the 
consistency of a theory from itself, contradicting G6del's incompleter~ess '.heorem. 
See [49] for details. 
The second part of (a) follows from (b). In connection with the first part of (a), 
we note that a pca distinguishing ~-sFp from ( lnd+ Tpa) expresses the partial 
correctness of a theorem prover which, while being nontrivial, is inherently simpler 
than one for LISP or Peano's arithmetic. See Bir6-Sain [14] for the details. [] 
Actually we have a strictly increasing infinite hierarchy of metho~,s betgeen ~-s~p 
and (lnd ~ Ex) (even modulo Peano's arithmetic for data [): 
Theorem 4.2 (Sain 1983) 
~-sFP <D ( lnd + ~YiEx) <D " " • <E ( lnd + ,Y, Ex) <E " " • <D ( lnd + Ex) 
where •..Ex postulates Ex only for those form ulas ~ ( z, x) in which the prenex complexity 
of  quantifiers over sort I is at most ,Yn. This statement holds "modulo Peano 's arithmetic 
for data" too. Further it remains valid i f  we add Tpa to every axiom system in it 
(besides Peano's arithmetic for data). 
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A proof is given in [49], but for completeness we note that the proof of Theorem 
4.1 can be refined (using ideas in Remark 8.7 below) to prove this theorem; another 
outline of the proof is available in [23]. 
Remark 4.3. The literature often considers I as a second-order sort, and then .Y,.Ex 
is called .Y~'-comprehension (see [13. p. 937]). 
Theorems 4.1, 4.2 can be used to conclude that adding flexible variables (y~, i e ~o, 
see Section 1) to temporal logic (F--sF or ~sFe) increases its proof theoretic power 
profoundly (if the axioms Ex are postulated for these new variables). More material 
on the subject of the present section is found in [14], [50, Section 5], [12, 49, 23, 21]. 
5. Provability of eventualities, fairness, and total correctness 
Until now we have characterized and compared formal systems w.r.t, partial 
ct~;t ectness assertions. One can treat provability of eventualities (like total correctness 
assertions) in NLP, as well as other kinds of statements about programs (see e.g. 
[50, 45, 60]). The following result illustrates this. 
First we note that when usr-d for proving eventualities, the Intermittent Assertions 
Method as well as Pnueli's method are understood to be extended with a so-called 
structural induction principle DIA~ acting on the data domain. The next theorem 
is formulated with this implicit understanding. This will be discussed in more detail 
later in the present section. 
Theorem 5.1 (Sain 1983). From the point of  view of total correctness assertions, the 
Intermittent Assertions Method is strictly weaker than Pnueli's method. But the 
difference between the powers of  these two methods disappears if we assume that the 
data theory ensures codability of  finite sequences (e.g. if it contains Peano ' s arithmetic). 
The equivalence part of this theorem is proved in [50]. The inequivalence part 
follows from the proof of Theorem 2.3 therein. To see this, one can check that 
provability from the stronger system considered in [50, Theorem 2.3] implies prova- 
bility by Pnueli's method in that special concrete case which was used there for 
establishing inequivalence. 
A characterization of the Intermittent Assertions Method from the point of view 
of total correctness is given in Theorems 2.7 and 4.4 of [50] under the assumption 
that the data theory (or, equivalently, specification) contains Peano's axioms (postu- 
lated for the data sort, of course) (cf. also [50, p. 286, lines 16-17]). It seems likely 
that the condition that the data theory has to contain Peano's arithmetic an be 
eliminated from the quoted characterization in [50] if we change the frame of the 
characterization slightly. Namely, the assertion "the program p terminates" was 
represented (in the formalism of time oriented NLP) in [50] by saying that p has 
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an execution sequence which terminates. If instead, we use the statement saying "'every 
execu,'ion sequence o fp  terminates", we obtain a slightly d~fferent representation f
total correctness assertions. We conjecture that under this new representation the 
charac'~erizations i  [50] can be improved. 
In [50], the key device for handling total correctness and termination is the 
three-sorted structural induction DIA~ formulated in the language of time oriented 
NLP as well as in first-order temporal ogic with flexible variables~ (This axiom 
scheme also appears in Manna and Pnueli's [33].) The school represented by Abadi 
and Manna [ 1-5] studies the same subject as we do in this paper, namely (comparison 
and characterization of) the proof theoretic powers of various temporal ogics of 
programs. However, they concentrate on provability of arbitrary temporal formulas 
as opposed to that of special kinds of program properties like pca's, total correctness 
assertions, etc. One might think that this general kind of investigation renders tudies 
of provabilP.ies of special program properties like e.g. the subject of the present 
section superfluous, since e.g. total correctness assertions are special temporal 
formulas. Actually this view seems to be implied in [2, Section 8] and [1, pp. 123, 
129]. However, putting the results in [ I -4] together with those in [50], apparently 
disproves this view in the following way. By [ 1-4], all the temporal inference systems 
in [1-5] are sound for the semantics "( lnd + Tpa) ~ ' .  However, by [50], no inference 
system sound for ( lnd + Tpa) can prove nontrivial total correctness assertions,  The 
reasons for this are basically the same as the ones explained in the celebrated 
historical Kfoury-Park paper [27]. The modification in [50] of the earlier argument 
is the following: Kfoury and Park conclude that termination is an essentially 
higher-order property; [50] shows that this higher-order-ness can be eliminated by 
using the nonstandard second-order sort I thus making a higher-order property 
first-order (bat many-sorted). 6 A key step is that we have to postulate structural 
induction DIA~ for all sorts (especially for the nonstandard second-order one !). 
These considerations (together with the further subtleties discovered in [50]) based 
on the classical Kfoury-Park ideas point in the direction that the investigations in
[1-5] cannot replace (or generalize) the ones initiated and pursued in [50, 44, 31, 
45]. The above observations do not diminish the importance of the research direction 
proposed in the quoted works of Abadi and Manna. Indeed, we ourselves will take 
up this direction in Sections 7 and 8. 
Many works in Computer Science Logics, when dealing with proving eventualities, 
emphasize the so-called principle of well founded orderings, see e.g. Krfger's work 
[28, Section I II. 10] or the tota~ con ectness ection of Gergely and l]ry's report [21]. 
Well founded relations are only one of the many equivalent tools for doing induction, 
as is well known. The point here as well as in the quoted literature is that we use 
induction on data (structural induction) as opposed to induction on time (computa- 
tional induction). (The former is important for proving eventualities while the latter 
More concretely, ( Ind + Tpa ) in itself does not imply any nontrivial total ccrJ'ectness a sertion. 
c, The idea of course comes from Henkin's historical nonstandard higher-order logic. 
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for invariance properties.) Therefore this principle of well foundcd relations (on 
data!) is the same as DIA or D/A~ (_Data Induction _Axioms) introduced by Andr6ka, 
N6meti and Sain in the 1979 version of  [10] for Computer Science first-order 
temporal ogic to treat eventualities. Therefore Theorem 5.1 as well as the other 
results in [44, 50] apply to the well founded framework in [28] and to any other 
form of induction on the data domain. 
6. Concurrency, nondeterminism, fairness, and clocks 
The characterization ~._FH ------E] lndq/in Theorem 2.3 carries over to concurrent and 
nondeterministic programs without any further assumptions (like clocks). 
We use fairness in the usual sense. In more detail: Let R ~_ nD x nD be the state 
transition relation (in data domain D) of  the nondeterministic program p. (Note 
that p is deterministic in D iff R is a function.) Let .~: T--, nD be an execution 
sequence of p in d~ = iT, D, ~,...). (This means that for every t e T, we have 
~(t) R~(t+l) . )  Now, ~ is said to be a fair execution o fp  iff (V(d,G)eR)x 
(ae Rng(~)~5e Rng(~)). In temporal formulation, ~ is a fair execution of p iff 
(1) it is an execution of p (i.e. ~:bi(~?=.~^O~iR35)), and (2) it is fair, i.e. 
Dv~(y R • --- oy  = ~). 
Theorem 6.1. (i) ~-s <u Indfor nondeterministic p a's. 
(ii) There is a nondeterministic p a p such that ~-sFp "p holds for fair executions" 
but V-sF "p holds for fair executions". 
That is, fairness separates ~-sF and ~-sFP. 
The idea of the proof of  (i) can be found in Theorem 7,3, but the proof of  Theorem 
7.3 has to be developed substantially to obtain a proof of the present heorem. The 
positive part is based on the proof in [52] for the third statement of the present 
Theorem 2 3. A full proof is available from the authors of this paper. 
Theorem 6.2. ~-sFp =- ( lnd + Tord) for all properties of deterministic programs. This 
is not true for ~-sF in place of ~-s~p. 
The proof is available from the authors. 
Recall from [1-4], that a clock is a temporal formula -),(~) satisfying 
c(~, )  O=e~ [F ] (3~,  (~)  ^ (~,(~) ~ ©[F] 7~, (~) ) ) .  
So a clock ? never "'shows the same time" in two different ime instances t and h. 
A weak clock, formalized as Cw(y), is permitted to show the same time in t and 
h but then t and t~ should not be distinguishable by atomic formulas or by 0~,(~). 
Assume 3'(~) is of the form ~ = ~. Then Cw(y) postulates 
( t (  f, = .~ ^  y, = x, ^ OY = ~)  - ,  O[  F ] (y  = . i  ~ (.r = x, ^ OY = x~))) :  
i ~ ! and i, x' and ix,} are disjoint} 
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where {y~ : i ~ I} is the set of  all flexible symbols in our language. For our purposes 
~.e may assume that I is finite and then Cw(~/) becomes a single formula. If fur 
some reason it would be important to keep I infinite then Cw(),) is a set of formulas 
and everything oes through still. 
Existence of weak clocks is a much weaker assumption than that of clocks, e.g. 
Cw(~=~) does not force the data domain to be infinite while C(~/) does. Also 
C(~=£)F-sFCW(~=~).  The results below generalize to the case when ~=£ is 
replaced with arbitrary ~, in Cw, but then Cw becomes Io~:ger to formulate (intuitive 
meaning remains the same). 
Theorem 6.3. ~--SFe =--~ (lnd + Tord) generalizes to nondeterministic and concurrent 
programs, if we assume the existence of a weak :lock (same for ordinary clocks). 
The proof is based on the ideas in the proof given in [52] for the third statement 
of  the present Theorem 2.3. A detailed proof is available from the authors of this 
paper. 
7. Temporal formulas in general 
Theorem 7.1. Even if we permit flexible predicate and function symbols, the temporal 
logics ~ SF and ~ SFe are complete for the semantics ( lnd + Tord ), if we assume the 
existence of a clock; i.e. for any temporal formulas ~ and y, (i)¢~(ii) below. 
(i) lnd+ Tord+C(~,)~ ,p, 
(ii) C(>) ~-sFp~P. 
The same holds with eveo,thing restricted to the langttage of ~-SF. 
The proof is based on the ideas in the proof given in [52] for the third statement 
of *he present Theorem 2.3, but some more work is needed. A detailed proof is 
available from the authors. 
The above theorem generalizes the completeness result for "7"," in [1-4] to 
Hilbert-style proof systems. In particular, for the formula ¢ constructed in Sections 
3-4 therein to show incompleteness for (lnd + Tord) of the Hilbert-style To found 
therein, we have ~--SF ~P (while I/-ro ~'). The following improves the above result by 
weakening the clock assumption. 
Theorem 7.2. ~-SFP is complete for ( Ind + Tord ) if we assume weak clocks; i.e. for any 
temporal ~, (i)¢=~(ii) below. 
(i) lnd + Tord + Cw( f  = ~) ~ tp, 
(ii) Cw(~ = .£) t-sFp ~. 
Note that the choices of  ~p and .~ are independent. 
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The proof is available from the authors. 
We note that Theorem 7.2 fails for ~-sF in place of b-SFP, i.e. b-sF is incomplete 
for ( lnd+ Total) under Cw(y =~) (but not under C(~,) by Theorem 7.1). 
Note that according to our convention i  the second paragraph of Section 2, the 
following theorem says that ~-s is incomplete ven for provability of formulas 
containing no other flexible symbols than flexible constants ("y/s"). 
Theorem 7.3. ~-s is not complete ven for the semantics "'( lnd ~ )'" (here everything 
is restricted to the ~-s-fragment, ofcourse); i.e. there is a formula ~ in the ~ s-fragment 
such that lnd ~ ~ but not ~ s ~P. 
Outline of the proof. The intuitive idea of the proof is the following. Let D be a 
first-order model with one binary relation R and constants O, n, b, c. Actually, we 
think of R as a nondeterministic successor function. Let D be as represented in Fig. 
1, with R represented by the vertical arrows pointing upward. Here O and a are 
infinitely far apart (i.e. Vn (R"(O) ¢ n).) Let Th de__r Th(D) be the complete first-order 
theory of D. Let y denote an element of I; i.e. y denotes a constant the value of 
which is allowed to change in time. Let ~ be the temporal formula 
( (~y  = O ^ ll::lx (x = y ^ O(x  R y))  ^ Oy  = c) - -  l ly ~ b), 
where O~p abbreviates -all-ag,. 
RT TR 
,,? TR 
b c 
R% PR 
I I  
I'R 
1'a D 
TR 
2 
I'R 
I 
T= 
O 
Fig. I 
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It is not hard to see that ( Ind+ Th)~ ~b. Therefore, using compactness, there is 
a finite Tho~ Th such that ( lnd+ Tho) ~ ~b. Let now ~ be the formula (p, Th,)--~ ~O. 
We may assume that all elements of Tho are closed formulas hence lnd ~ ¢. 
To see that I,~s ~, consider the following. It is not hard to extend our above 
structure !) to a model .44 of I-s such that .4/~ ~. In passing we note that ~,t4 ~ Ind 
because if ~$(z) is the formula Vz~(y(z)=y(zt)--* z = z~), where z, z~ are variables 
of sort T, then ~(z) holds in the first time instant, ~(z) is preserved under the 
successor o fT ,  but 6(z) is not true for that time instant z for which y( : )  =a. [] 
Theorem 7.4. t-o is complete for the semantics lndqt ; i.e. for any temporal formula 
in the language of F , ~-o ~ iff lndq I ~ ~. 
The proof is available from the authors. 
Con|eetute 7.5. We conjecture that for any temporal .formula ~¢ in the ~-szfragment, 
O-s ~P iff lnd~ ~ ~ ). Here the set lnd~ c lnd is induction over those formulas which 
contain only one variable of si, rt T. 
In connection with the problems raised at the end of [ I -4],  besides Section 8 
(which is entirely devoted to these problems), we obtain the following. 
Abadi [2, 3] proved that Manna and Pnueli's inference systems in [33] become 
incomplete for the semantics ( lnd + Tord) if we add flexible predicate (or function) 
symbols. ([33] does not allow these.) in Theorem 7.6 we state that this incomplet~ ness 
remains true even without allowing (or adding) flexible predicates (or functions). 
Theorem 7.6. The inference system introduced in [33] for temporal l,~gic with 0 and 
[ F] is incomplete for the semantics (lnd + Tord). Moreover, it remoras incomrlete 
after adding al! propositionally valid Jormulas (cf. (A!) herein) and any finite number 
of  new axioms (valid in ( Ind + Tord ) ). 
The proof is a refinement of that of Theorem 7.1(ii), and is available from the 
authors. 
Theorem 7.7. The inference system Tt introduced in Abadi's papers [ 1-4] is incomplete 
for ( lnd + Tord) if used without "" Until". This is so even if we assume the existence 
of weak clocks, and despite T~'s being reinforced with a rule permitting the use of 
auxiliao, definitions in proofs. By the remark at the end of [2, Section 7] discussing 
"" T~ without Until", we conclude that clocks do increase the power of  this system. 
The proof is a refinement of that of Theorem 7.1(ii), a,id is available from the 
authors. 
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Problem 7.8. Are Theorems 6.3 or 7.2 true without assuming any kind of clocks? 
Problem 7.9. Is ~-s ------El lnd~ true for nondeterministic programs, where lnd~( c_ lnd) 
is induction over NLP formulas containing at most one variable of sort T? 
8. Clocks and arithmetical formulas (solutions of published temporal ogic problems) 
Next ~,e turn to solving some open problems raised in recent publications of the 
Computer Science Temporal Logic school represented by Manna and Pnueli [33, 
34], Abadi and Manna [5] and Abadi [1-4]. These problems concern the proof 
theoretic powers ofthe inference systems: To introduced in [33, 34], and reformulated 
in [1-4] (the notation To was ~ntroduced in the latter references), the resolution 
system R of[5] with its final form in [3, 2], and Tt, T, of[ l -4].  (Here 7", is equivalent 
with R; while the essence of T, is allowing recursive definitions "along time" in 
To). The last sentence in the "Open problems" sections of [ I-4] asks if a clock adds 
power to T, or R. (This question is understood modulo infinite data domains, of 
course). We will answer this problem affirmatively. To recall the second problem 
we are going to solve, we need the following. 
Definition 8,1 (Abadi [1-4]). A temporal formula ~ is said to be arithmetical in the 
proof system ~ iff (either ~ ~ or else there is a temporal formula 3' such that 
C(3')---, ~). 
The first "Example" in Section 6 "Clocks and arithmetical formulas" of [!] 
contains a question asking for "more subtle examples" of nonarithmetical formulas. 
We will answer this question below by exhibiting a nonarithmetical (in any of 
To . . . . .  7"2 listed above) formula which is valid in all standard-time models. This 
question seems to be implicit in all of [ 1-4]. Namely, each of these papers contains 
a theorem stating that every formula valid in all standard-time models is arithmetical 
in 7"2 (see the theorem in [1, p. 127], [2, Theorem 6.2], [3, Theorem 5.16] and the 
second theorem in [4, p. 12]). Unfortunately, this turns out to be false. Probably it 
was the lack of a timely answer to the above quoted open problem which had led 
to the belief in the truth of [2, Theorem 6.2] (and to its equivalent versions in the 
other quoted papers). Unfortunately, the new discovery influences the status of the 
strongest available (by now) temporal inference system, and renders it an open 
problem to find a natural temporal inference system which would be equivalent 
with Peano's arithmetic (cf. e.g. the Abstract at the beginning of [2] as well as 
Theorem 7.2 therein, the proof of which essentially uses Theorem 6.2). Some further 
parts of the "Open questions" sections of [1-4] will also be settled below. (In 
particular the "clock rule" suggested in those sections turns out to be not sound for 
"( lnd +Tord ~ )'" or even "( Ind + Tpa ~ )'" modulo infinite data domains). 
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The results in the present section (including the above outlined solutions of open 
problems published in [1-4]) were obtained by Sain during 1987-1988 and were 
reported in [54-56]. In particular, Theorem 8.2 below is almost he same as Theorem 
2 in [54]. Despite this, we also give a full proof here, for the following reasons: (1) 
the key lemma (Claim 8.5) in the proof of the theorem is proved in [54] by a 
completely different method. The present method may be applicable in new situ- 
ations. A concrete difference is that here we try to avoid using famous very hard 
theorems (like the solution of Hilbert's tenth problem). We do this because we are 
trying to help the reader to see why the theorem is true in very concrete and "down 
to earth" terms. (2) There are some cases of both versions of the theorem not covered 
by the other. (3) To keep the present paper self-contained. 
For a temporal formula q,, let ~ '~,  denote that ~, is valid in all standard-time 
models. A model .4 /=(T,D,  yo . . . .  ) is standard-time iff its time frame T is the 
standard (co, 0, suc, 4). Recall that Abadi's papers write "~ g," for our ~ ,p (cf. 
e.g. [1, p. 124]). 
The following theorem concerns the temporal ogic I-F of [33, 34, 5] and in 
Abadi's papers containing © and IF]  as its only modalities, and flexible variable 
constants (y,, i~ co) as its only flexible symbols. By the nature of the result, it is 
automatically inherited by stronger systems. The result concerns the following 
inference systems for ~-F : the resolution based R of [5], To of [33, 34, 1-4] and T~, 
T, of  [ 1-4]. 
Theorem 8.2. (i) There is a temporal sentence 0 in the intersection of  the language of 
our ~-SF and that of  Manna's, Pnueli" s, Abadi" s temporal logic ~-F such that ~"  ¢ 
and O is not arithmetical 7 in any of the following proof systems: Abadi' s T2, Tt, To, 
Abadi- Manna 's R [5], or Manna- Pnueli" s Nexttime System [33], nor in our ~- sF or 
~ SFP. 
in more detail: 0 is valid in the standard-time models, and ~T2 O, ~sFPO, and 
t~n O, but if we assume the existence of  any clock, O becomes provable in all the systems 
mentioned above this theorem, including To, ~'sF, and R. 
(ii) Abadi- Monna " s R [5], and Abadi" s T~ [ 1-4], restricted to infinite data domains 
become stronger if we add clocks. See item (8.10) at the end of the proof or more detail. 
(iii) The inference systems in (ii) wi~h clocks added are not sound for the semantics 
(restricted to infinite domains, of  course) denoted by ~-o or by ~-p in [1-4] (which 
semantics ore the same as our ( lnd + Tord ~ ) or ( lnd + Tpa ~ ) respectively). See 
(8.11) at the end of the proof or more detail. 
Proof. Let PAo denote a sufficiently strong finite part of Peano's axioms (PA) for 
N = (o~, O, suc, 4,  +, x). For example, PAo states that ~ is a linear discrete ordering, 
its usual relationship with suc, O, and +; further PAo states the recursive definitions 
of + and x from suc. Let (PA[b) be obtained from PAo by replacing the axiom 
7 In the sense of [i, p. 127, 2-4], which is also fully recalled in the present paper. 
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stating that there is no greatest element by the axioms Vx (x<~ b), suc(b)= b. We 
note that we still require that (Vx< b) (st:, !s one-one). So (PArb) states that b is 
the greatest element, but arithmetic (+, x, etc.) between 0 and b is the usual. 
A typical model for (PArb)  is 
(Nrn)  ~f ([0, 1 . . . . .  n}, O, (sucrn),  (<~ r n), (+r n), (x  r n)) 
for any n ~ to, where (suc r n)( n ) = n, and for x < n, (suc r n)(x)  = x + 1, and similarly 
for + and x. Since (PA[ b) is finite, we will identify it with the sentence V~ A (PAr b). 
We draw (Nrn) as 
0 I n-  I n 
So the horizontal --, denotes uccessor, the point to the right is the bigger one, and 
we do not draw + and x. 
An infinite model for (PArb) is 
0 I 2 n oc 
where for all n, m e to, 
(n + m, n x m are the usual, 
and if n = oo then n + x = n x x = oo = b for all x). 
This is a fairly trivial model, and it satisfies (PArb) only because induction is not 
postulated in (PAth)  (or in PAo for that matter). 
For i e to, y~ denotes a flexible constant of temporal logic. Let "Fo be the following 
temporal sentence: 
( PAI b) ^  Yo = 0 A [ F] 3x  (x = Yo A OYo = SUC(X)) ^  (F)yo = b. 
Con(PA) denotes the usual formula in the language of Peano arithmetic stating 
that PA is consistent. Con(PA) is of the form Vx 7(x) with 7(x) a 2:o-formula (see 
e.g. [13, pp. $28, i 1~6]). Intuitively, 7(x) states that the sequence coded by x is not 
a derivation of FALSE from PA. Let ~p~ be the temporal sentence ,Po^ 
(=Ix< b) -aT(x). 
Recall that for any temporal formula ~, ~,o denotes validity in standard-time 
models, i.e. in models the time-frame of which is the standard (to, 0, suc, <~). We 
note that ~ ~ was denoted by ~ ~ in [1-4] (see [3, p. 93]). 
Claim 8.3. ~ -a,p~. 
We will return to the (easy) proof of this later. 
Recall that Abadi's t-T,,, [1-4] is almost he same as our t--sF (the only difference 
is that To allows "Unti l"  but has no @ among its temporal modalities). Further 
recall that Abadi's T~ and T2 are extensions of To, hence if some ~ is To-provable 
t~3en it is automatically T~- and T,-provable. 
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Claim 8.4. ~ -~,  and ~s~P -a~p~. 
We will return to the proof later (Claim 8.4 will easily follow from G6del's tronger 
incompleteness theorem and Abadi's soundness (for Peano's arithmetic) for 7", ; i.e. 
[3, Theorem 5.17]). 
The following claim says that ~ is provable from the assumption that a clock 
exists. Recall from Section 6 that for a temporal formula ~,(~), C(~)  denotes the 
formula stating that ~ is a clock. 
Claim 8.5. Let 0(~)  be any temporal formula. Then 
(i) ~-sF C ( O ) --* -a~p , and 
(ii) *-to C(~)  -, 7¢ , .  
Proof of Claim 8.5. Assume there exist a nonstandard model 2/ of ~-sF or of ~-r,, 
and some time instance to of 2/ such that to II- C(O) and to I~ ~Pl. Let this 2/ and 
to be fixed. (We write to Ik- ¢ instead of 2/, to I~- ~ which is denoted as 2/~,,, ~ in 
[22] and as ,f/@ to~ ~ in [2].) Recall that ~ is of the form ¢(~) with ~ as (the 
sequence of) its free variables. Let £/> x abbreviate that every member of Y, is ~>x; 
i.e. • = (Xo,. • •, x,) and :Co >I x ^ • • • ^  x, >t x. From now on we will use this notation 
~> x freely. 
The reader interested in proving the present Claim 8.5 only for Abadi's relatively 
strong systems T, or 7"_, may safely skip the first part, ending with item (8.3) of our 
proof. The reason for this is that Abadi's so-called arithmetical completeness theorem 
(e.g. [3, Theorem 5.18]) for T~ states that ( lnd+Tord)~C(O) - - . r  implies 
~-T, C(t)--* y for any 3,. (Since 7", is even stronger than Tin, this applies to T2 a 
fortiori.) Therefore to prove (ii) for 7", (instead of To), it is enough to prove 
( lnd + Tord) ~ C(O) --~ -a¢,.  So in this case we may assume ~¢/~ ( lnd + Tord). The 
first part, ending with (8.3) below, of this proof is aimed at proving that we may 
assume 2 /~ Tord even in the case of such "weak" systems like To for which no 
version of the above quoted "arithmetical completeness" theorem has been pub- 
lished, s
Let ~- be either ~-sF or ~-r,,. First we transform 2/ in such a way that its being a 
model o f~ and (2/, to) It- C(O) ^  ~, are preserved while Tord will become true in it. 
We may assume that (Vt~ T)(3t, . . .  t,)(Vi<n)(t~<~t~+~ or suc(t,)=t~+,) and 
t = t,. Namely, if we throw away at: elements of T which are not reachable this 
way then the truthvalue of C(O) and ~,1 at to is not affected (neither is that of"being 
a model of  ~-"). 
Next, we apply the known method of collapsing the undistinguishable (by first- 
order temporal formulas with parameters from D) elements of T. Let ~+= 
(T +, D . . . .  ) be the result of applying this collapsing procedure to ~.  Then by 
s In passing we note that for ~-SF an arithmetical completeness theorem (saying that (Ind+ 
Tara ) ~ C( ,!,~ "-, 3' iff ~-SF C(0)  "-" y for any 0, 3, in the language of  ~-sF) was announced by A. Pasztor. 
The proof  is a,,ailable from A. Pasztor. 
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(3/, to) It- C(~) ,  we prove that T + is linearly ordered, as follows: 
I ft ,  t teTandSagreesontandh then(tU-cpc:~tt l l -~) fora l l~p,  (8.1) 
since otherwise to l t - (F)3~((~p^d/(~)A(F)(7~o^d/(~)))v( -acp^d/(~)^(F)(~^ 
0(~)))) would be "~--provable", 9 contradicting C(0) .  Therefore any two elements 
of  T + are comparable. Antisymmetry easily follows from C(O). So linear ordering 
is proved. 
Consider the structure S=(S,  sc,<~) defined by first letting f(t)d----er{~E 
"D: t R- ~(~)}, for any t ~ T, and then S is the natura! f- in,age of  T, that is S = 
Range(f) ,  sc( f ( t ) )=f(suc(t ) ) ,  and f(t)<~f(tt) iff (t ~ tl in T). Now, by (8.1), S is 
isomorphic to T +. Let us turn to checking that S ~ Tord, that is that S is elementarily 
(classical first-order) equivalent with (co, suc, <~). Indeed, S ~ (Vzt ~> z) 
(zl # z -~ sc(z) <~ zl) follows from ~("10(~)  ^ (F)d/(~)) --* C)(F)O(~). S ~ z < sc(z) 
follows from C(O) and from ~-C)q, --" (F)cp. Further S ~ Vz :lzt (z = sc(z~) v z = O) 
where 0~f f ( to )  follows from I--((-a~p ^(F )¢ ) - - , (F )C~p)  which is an immediate 
consequence of the temporal induction axiom. 
By S ~ Tord and S--- T + we have 
3/+ ~ Tord. (8.~) 
(Note that we do not claim 3 /+~ Ind.) From now on, we denote the element of  
T + corresponding to to with to, too. (So if we identify T + and S then to also denotes 
f(to).) Now, 
(3/+, to) It- C(~)  ^  ~ot and 3/+ is a model oft-- (8.3) 
has been proved. 
From now on we will work in 3/+, in particular, to It- cp means (3/+, to) U- cp. We 
• ::~I! heavily rely on (8.2). 
Let cl(x) be the formula [F](: : l~>x)~/,(~) and cof be the formula 3x (X=yo^ 
(F)  el(x)). We will prove by temporal induction that to t-[F]cof. 
(1) to It- cof follows from to t-- C (0)  and from to It- cpo, the latter of which implies 
to It- Yo = 0 and V~ (~ ~> 0), hence to ~ c/(0).  
(2) Assume t '~  > to and t' It- cof. Then (::It ~> t') such that 
t ~- cl(x) for some x with t' It-x = Yo. (8.4) 
Let this x with t' It- x =Yo be fixed for the rest of  this proof. If  t It- cl(x+ 1) then, 
by t' U- -O(x+ 1 = Yo), we have t' It- Ocof .  Since it is the latter what we want to 
prove, we may assume t I~- cl(x+l) .  Let us assume n =0. Then ~=(Xo)=Xo. 
Kd-e-f {x~"D:x~x~x+l  and t~-(F)d/(~)). 
Then k~r[K[<2.  Thus there are h and t + with (V i>0)  ( i<~k~t<~t~<t+) 
and (V~ K)(~i  << . k) t~ ~- 0(~). Then, by C(O), we have (V~ K)  t + ~- [F ]  "~0(~). 
By (8.4) then t~ < t + It- [F ] ( ( : l~>x)  0(~) and (V~¢ K)-aO(~)) .  Thus t + It-- [F ]  
::1~ (x <~  ~ K and 0(~)). By t <~ t+ ~- (F )0(~)  and x ~< ~ ~ K we conclude ~ ~> x + 1. 
Hence t + ~ [ F](::I~ ~> x + 1) 0(~). That is t + ~- cl(x + 1). Since (8.4) t' It- x = Yo, by 
9 This follows from ~-"(F)(F)---~(F)" and b-"C)-*(F)'" together with the less trivial I-((F)¢,~^ 
(F)¢2) -~ (F)((¢~ ^  (F)¢2) v ( ~, ^  (F)¢O) , proved in [47]. 
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'Po we have t ' l l -C ) (x+l=yo) .  Then t ' l l -O(x+l=yo^(F)c l (x+l ) )  that is 
t' ~ Ocof. Since at the beginning of the present item (2) the choice of t' ~> to was 
arbitrary, we proved 
to II- [ F ]( cof --* C cof ). 
From this and (1), temoo~al induction yields 
to It- [ ~:]cof. (8.5) 
We proved (8.5) for the special case n =0. We note the n =0 assumption was 
used only on the "(8.4) =o t II- (F)cl(x + 1)" part. The generalization of  the proof of 
(8.5) to arbitrary n goes the natural way and is available in [54]. We do not recall 
it here. In the rest of  the present proof, n is arbitrary again. 
By to t- ~o we have to II- (F)(yo = b). Then by (8.5), to It- (F)(yo = b ^  cof) which, 
by Yo = b ^  co f~ (Yo = b ^  (F) c/(b)) implies tot--(F) cl(b). This by definition is 
to IF- (F)[F](::I~ ~> b) 0(~). Let/~= (b, b, . . . .  b). Then by the (PAr b) part of q~o we 
have (~ t> b =O • = b). Thus to II- (F)[F]0(/~) hence to ~ (F)(0(/~) ^  O0(/~)), contra- 
dicting to~-C(O). We derived a contradiction from assuming the existence of a 
(nonstandard) model ~ff of t-'SF or To such that for a time instance to of ~ ,  
toll-- C(O) ^  ~1. This proves that C(0)  -* -~  holds in every nonstandard model of 
both t--SF and To. Since these inference systems are complete for their nonstandard 
models (for the To case, see e.g. [3, Theorem 5.7] or [1, p. 126]), both (i) and (ii) 
of  Claim 8.5 are proved. [] 
Proof of Claim 8.4. We want to prove (i) ~T2 -1~0, and (ii) b~sF e -1~. 
Consider (i): Let Al l - (PA+-TCon(PA))  (exists by G6del's incompleteness 
theorem). Then for our formulation Vx3,(x) of Con(PA), there is d~A with 
A~ - ly(d).  Let 2d<beA be fixed. 
Let A[b=({a~A: a<~b}, O, (suc[b), (<~[b), (+rb), (×rb) , )  be the usual "'initial 
segment" of  A with b as its greatest element. Let (Idrb):A--* (At b) be defined by 
(Idrb)(x) = min(x, b) as usual. Let ~ff =(A, (Arb), (ld[b)) be a two-sorted model 
for the language Lo associated to To in Abadi's paper, with (ld[b) interpreting the 
flexible constant Yo. Consider the translation function P in Abadi's paper mapping 
temporal formulas to Lo. (In passing we note that Lo and P were first introduced 
by Andr~ka, N~meti and Sain in the 1978 version of [9], and by Sain [43] for 
computer science temporal logics.) Now, ~ff ~ P(c0,) which, using Abadi's notation, 
means t~e P(~o,), see e.g. [2, Sections 2.3 and 3.2]. In particular "t -e" was defined 
in [2, p. 46] to be the same as "'(lnd + Tpa ~)'" of Bir6 and Sain [14] (which agrees 
in its notational system with [10]), and it was proved implicitly in the latter that 
.~ ~ lnd+ Tim, hence by .~ff ~ P(q,t) we have lnd+ Tpa ~ P('Tcp,), thus ~p P(-~p,) 
in Abadi's notation. 
Then, by Abadi's soundness theorem for T2 (this is in [2, Theorem 7.1] and is in 
[1, p. 128]), we conclude b~T 2~cp~ as was desired for (]).lo 
~o This soundness theorem isnot true in general (as was shown in [54, Theorem 3]), but it is true in 
the special case we need it here. 
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A quick glance at the above model ~ also proves (ii). [] 
Remark 8.6. The above proof also establishes that 
( lnd + Tpa) ~ "7~p,. (8.7) 
By [49, Section V.I] 
( Ind + Tpa + Ex) ~ -a¢m. (8.8) 
Looking into the lattice of logics of programs at the end of [47, 48] or [36], (8.7) 
and (8.8) give information about the proof theoretic powers of other computer 
science temporal logics. It appears that (Ind + Ex)~ -~o~, and repeating the same 
argument with Con(PAo+(lnd[~)) in place of Con(PA), as in [14] or [49, Section 
V.I], one could probably prove ( lnd + Ex) <D ( lnd + Tpa + Ex). However, we do 
not know if ( lnd+ Tsuc+Ex) or (Ind+ Tord+Ex) imply -a¢, (i.e. i fone of these 
is strictly weaker than (lnd + Tpa + Ex), cf. (8.8)). 
Proof of Claim 8.3. Let .4g = ((o~, 0, suc. ~), D, Yo) be a standard-time model (D is 
arbitrary of course), and assume ~ ~ ~,. Then Yo: (o~, 0, suc) --* (D, 0 °, suc °) is a 
homomorphism onto D that is Rng(yo)= D. Further D ~ (PAolb). In particular D 
has a greatest element b and b =yo(n) for some n~o,. Then D must be finite. But 
then D = (D, O r', sucr', +, ×, d) ~ Vx ~(x) since Con(PA) holds in the standard 
model of arithmetic. This contradicts our assumption ~ ~ ~o, proving ~ ~ "7~pt for 
any standard-time model ~.  17 
We continue proving Theorem 8.2. Claim 8.5 proves that -7~,~ is provable from 
assuming the existence of any clock in any proof system ~ not weaker than Abadi's 
~-To or our ~-sF. This applies, in particular, to Abadi's ~-To, ~--T,, ~--T2" Therefore, by 
Claim 8.4, 
"7~,, is not arithmetical in T2, T,, To, or R, nor in ~-sFp or t-sF. (8.9) 
Thus 7~,, is the "more subtle example of a nonarithmetical formula" Abadi is 
asking for at the beginning of the item in "Examples" in [2, p. 58]. Namely 7~,, is 
not arithmetical in T2, T~, To but it is valid in standard-time models by our Claim 
8.3. Abadi's question was motivated by the fact that at that time the only known 
examples of nonarithmetical formulas were like 3x, y(x ~ y) which were of course 
not valid (even in ~_,o). Therefore, Claims 8.3-8.5 answer the last open question in 
[1, Section 9]; [2, Section 9] and [3, Section 5.9] in the following way: 
A clock does add power to T,, namely ~'~ '~h,  indeed "7~,~ is 
T,-provable if we assume the existence of a clock, but ~T, "7~,,. 
The same applies to the resolution system R of [5] which 
answers a question in [3, Section 5.9]. (All this is valid when 
the data domains are restricted to be infinite.) (8.10) 
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The second sentence of the second problem in [3, Section 5.9] ~nd [1, Section 
9] introduces a new proof rule to 7", which permits us to assume the existence of 
a clock formula c(x) (and use C(c) as an axiem) wit~l c a new flexible predicate 
symbol not occurring in the formula we wa~tt o prove. Then it is claimed in the 
quoted papers that this new rule (in particular "T~ +the new rule") is harmless as 
long as the domain of discourse is infinite. Since the semantics used for TI in the 
quoted papers is "( lnd + Tord ~)" denoted here by ~-o,~' it is useful to point out that: 
(Tt+the new clock ru!e) is not sound for the semantics (lnd+ 
Tord + the data domain is infinite ~) or equivalently for "~-o+ 
data domain is infinite". Nor is it sound for the semantics 
( Ind + Tpa + data domain is infinite). (8.11 ) 
Proof of (8.11). By the proof of Claim 8.4 (the data domain is infinite) M-r, -7~p,. By 
Abadi's completeness theorem for 7", ([3, p. 81, Theorem 5.18], also proved in [1]), 
this implies (domain infinite) M-o -l~p~ or equivalently (lnd + Tpa +domain 
infinite) ~ -7~pl. Actually by repeating the proof of Claim 8.4 with slight changes, 
one can obtain a direct proof of the latter. However, Claim 8.5 implies that 
~ro C(c)---~ Ttp~, hence the above new rule does prove ~p~. Thus the new rule is 
not sound for infinite domains when added to To or T~. I--d 
Recall that Abadi writes ~ ~, for what we denote ~ ~, (validity in standard-time 
models). Therefore in Abadi's notation, we have ~ -,~o, by Claim 8.3. Now, (8.9) 
completes the proof of (i) of Theorem 8.2, by choosing 0 to be ~m.  (8.10) proves 
(ii), and (8.11) proves (iii) of Theorem 8.2. [] 
Remark 8.7. Theorem 8.2(i) proves that Theorem 6.2 [2, p. 60] and the theorem of 
[1, p. 127] (also [3, p. 75]) saying that 
(~,o ~,) =~ (~, is arithmetical in 7"_,) (8.12) 
are not true. The main result of these works, completeness of the inference system 
t--~ for Abadi's semantics t - ,  (which is our "'(Ind + Tpa ~)") is based on the above 
disproved theorem. In more detail, Theorem 6.2 of [2] quoted above is used in these 
papers to prove the main completeness theorem (for T.,) which is the second 
statement of the Completeness Theorem in [1, p. 128]. The proof of this completeness 
theorem heavily uses the above disproved (8.12), see e.g. the first sentence of the 
proof either in [2] or in [3]. Unfortunately, this application of (8.12) turns out to 
tl The fact that in the above quotation "'harmless" is understood w.r.t, the semantics ~-o is indicated 
at the end (in brackets) of the first sentence of Abadi's presently quoted second problem. Namely it is 
mentioned there that T t and R are complete for arithmetical formulas. Now, this is stated and proved 
as a theorem (in the quoted papers) w.r.t. ~-o as a semantics. 
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be essential. Namely, a modified version of our counterexample ( -~h)  constructed 
in the above proof can be used to show that T, is indeed not complete for t-e, that 
is for (lnd + Tpa t=). The modification consists of replacing Con(PA), which was 
denoted as Vx 7(x), in our ~,t with a slightly weaker statement Vx 3,~(x) such that 
PA ~ Vx 7t(x) becomes true but "barely". Here "barely" means that Vx 7,(x) does 
not follow from slightly weaker versions of PA. For example, as in [14], one could 
choose Vx 7~(x) to be Con(l,~,) for a suitable n ~ to, where !,~, is obtained from 
PA by restricting the induction schema of PA to ,$,-formulas. For the new tpt we 
will have t-~, tpt but ~T2 ~Pt. This construction is described in more detail in Remark 
3 of [54]. A detailed proof can be found in [58] as well as in [7, 59]. 
Open problem. F ind,  nice, Hiibert-style inference system ~- for first-order temporal 
logic which is sound and complete for (ind + Tpa ~),  i.e. for Abadi's I--p. 
9. Related considerations 
On eliminating the medality ~): though @ is strongly related to (is actually a weakened 
version of) the "standard" or "usual" temporal modality ~ (jetzt, i.e. now), cf. ['!9, 
Chapter 11.2, Section 4.10 (pp. 120-124)], and though Kamp proved that ~ cannot 
be eliminated (cf. [19, p. 123 item (5')]), we show how to eliminate ~) from our 
logics. The problem is that @ occurs in (A5), i.e. in temporal induction for F-o and 
for t--s. Below we show how to formulate (A5) or temporal induction for t--o and 
for t-s without using @. For this purpose we allow propositional variables to occur 
in our first-order temporal language. Let q be a propositional variable and ~ be a 
formula. Let "(q codes ~))" be the formula 
(<>q ^ l-l(q ~ O-Tq)  ^  D(-~q ~ O- lq)) .  
Let (A5*) postulate 
( ( q codes @) ^  I'q( q --, ~p ) A D(~p -'~ O~'))  --" I-q~. 
Tempot'a! induction without using @ is: 
(A5 *~) {(q codes ®), (q -~ ~o), (¢ -* O¢~)} t- ~. 
Now, eliminating @ from ~-s, ~-sF, t-s~:P goes by replacing @~p for any formula 
by ((q codes ®)^ E](q ~ ~p)). Any program p can be equivalently rewritten such 
that the control never goes back to the start label, and then the axioms describing 
p will imply that ("at start" codes @). 
Temporal proofs 149 
Acknowledgment 
Thanks are due to Mart in Abadi, Leszek Hollendc.fski, Andrzej Szalas, and Yde 
Venema for their valuable remarks and suggestio~ < 
References 
[~] M. Abadi, The power of temporal proofs, in: Proc. 2rid Ann. IEEE Syrup. on Logic in Computer 
Science, Ithaca, NY (1987) 123-130. 
[2] M. Abadi, The power of temporal proofs, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 64 (1989) 35-84. 
[3] M. Abadi, Temporal-logic theorem proving, Dissertation, Stanford Univ., Dept. ofComp. Sci., 1987. 
[4] M. Abadi, Temporal logic was incomplete only temporarily, Preprint, 1989. 
[5] M. Abadi and Z. Manna, A timely resolutn.m, in: Ist Ann. Syrup. on Logic in Computer Science 
(1986) 176-189. 
[6] H. Andr~ka, K. Balogh, K. L~ibadi, I. N~meti and P. T6th, Plans to improve our program verifier 
program (in Hungarian), Working Paper, NIM IGI~SZI, Dept. of Software Techniques, Budapest, 
1974. 
[7] H. Andr~ka, Y. Gorenko, I. N~meti and I. Sain, Effective temporal ogics of programs, manuscript 
in preparation. 
[8] H. Andr~ka and I. N~meti, Completeness of Floyd logic, But t. Section of Logic (Wro,Ja~,) 7(3) 
(1978) 115-121. 
[9] H. Andr~ka, I. N~meti and I. Sain, Henkin-type semantics for program schemes to turn negative 
results to positive, in: L. Budach, ed., Fundamentals of Computation Theory "79, 2 (Proc. Conf. 
Berlin, 1979) (Akademie Yerlag, Berlin, 1979) 18-24 
[10] H. Andr~ka, i. N~meti and I. Sain, A complete logic for reasoning about programs via nonstandard 
model theory, Parts I- I I ,  Theoret. Comput. Sci. 17(2, 3) (1982), 193-212, 2.59-278. 
[ I I ] H. Andr~ka, !. N~meti and I. Sain, On the strength of temporal proofs (extended abstract), in: A. 
Kreczmar and G. Mirkowska, eds., Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science 379 (Springer, Berlin, 1989) 135-144. 
[13] 1. Barwise, ed., Handbook of Mathematical Logic (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977). 
[ 14] B. Bir6 and I. Sain, Peano arithmetic for the time scale of nonstandard models for logics of programs, 
Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, to appear. 
[15] R. Cartwright and J. McCarthy, First order programming logic, in: Proc. 6th Ann. ACM Syrup. on 
Principles of Programming Languages (1979) 68-80. 
[ 16] L. Csirmaz, Programs and program verification in a general setting, Theoret. Comput. ScL 16 (1981) 
199-210. 
[17] L. Csirmaz, A completeness theorem for dynamic logic, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 26(I) (1985) 
51-60. 
[18] L. Csirmaz and J. Paris, A property of 2-sorled Peano models and program verification, Z. Math. 
Logic Grundlagen Math. 30 (1984) 324-334. 
[19] D. Gabbay and F. Guenther, eds., Handbook of Philosophical Logic II (D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1984). 
[20] D. Gabbay, A. Pnueli, S. Shelah and J. Stavi, On the temporal analysis of fairness, in: Proc. 7th 
Ann. A C M Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages (1980) 163-173. 
[21] T. Gergely and L. IJry, First-order programming theories, SZAMALK Technical Report Budapest, 
1991, 355 pp. 
[22] R. Goldhlatt, Logics of time and computation, in: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 
Lecture Notes 7 (1987). 
[23] P. H~jek, Some conservativeness results for nonstandard dynamic logic, in: 1. Demetrovics, G. 
Katona and A. Salomaa, eds., Algebra, Combinatorics, and Logic in Computer Science, Proc. Conf. 
Gy6r Hungary 198~, Colloq. Math. Soc. J. Bolyai 42 (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986) 443-449. 
[24] D. Harel, First-Order Dynamic Logic, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 68 (Springer, Berlin, 1979). 
[25] L. Henkin, J. D. Monk and A. Tarski, CylindricAIgebras Part I I  (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1985). 
[26] J.A.W. Kamp, Formal properties of "'Now", Theoria 37 (1971) 227-273. 
150 14. Andr~ka et al. 
[27] D.J. Kfoury and D.M.R. Park, On the termination of program schemes, Inform. and Control 29 
(1975) 243-251. 
[28] F. Kr6ger, Temporal logic of programs, EA TCS Monographs on Theoretical Computer Science (1988 ). 
[29] D. Leivant, Logical and mathematical reasoning about imperative programs, in" Proc. 12th Ann. 
A CM Symp. on Principles of Programming Language.~, New Orleans (1985) 132-140. 
[30] O. Lichtenstein, A. Pnueli and L. Zuck, The glory of the past, in: R. Parikh, ed., Proc. Coll. Logics 
of Programs, Brooklyn, USA, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 192 (Springer, Berlin, 1985) 
196-218. 
[31] A.(3. Luezas, T.H. (3onzalez and M.R. Artalejo, Standard versus nonstandard semantics in logics 
for functional programs, Preprint, Dept. Informatica y Automatica, Univ. Complutense, Madrid, 
1989, 44pp. 
[32] J.A. Makowsky and I. Sain, Weak second order characterizations of various program verification 
systems, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 66 (1989) 299-321. 
[33] Z. Manna and A. Pnueli, The modal ogic o|" programs, in: Internat. Coll. on Automata, Languages 
and Progranlming "79, (3raz, Lecture Notes in Compt:ter Science 71 (Springer, Berlin, 1979) 385-409. 
[34] Z. Manna and A. Pnueli, Verification of concurrent programs: A temporal proof system, Report 
No. STAN-CS.83-967, Comp. Sci. Dept., Stanford Univ., 1983. 
[35] Z. Manna a,ld A. Pnueli, A hierarchy of temporal properties, Tech. Repor~ S1AN-CS-87-1186, 
Dept. of Computer Science, Stanford Univ., 1987. 
[36] I. N,~meti, Nonstandard dynamic logic, in: D. Kozen, ed., Logic.~ of Programs, Proc. Conf., New 
York, 1981, Lecture Notes in Computer Science IJl (Springer, Berlin, 1982) 311-348. 
[37] R. Parikh, A decidability result for second order process logic, in: IEEE Syrup. on Foundations of 
Computer Science (! 978) 177-183. 
[38] A. Pasztor, Non-standard algorithmic and dynamic logic, J. Symbolic Comput. 2 (1986) 59-81. 
[39] A. Pasztor, Recursive programs and denotational semantics in absolute logics of prog,-ams, Theoret. 
Comput. Sci. 70 (I) (1990) 127-150. 
[40] A. Pasztor and I. Sain, A streamlined temporal completeness theorem, in: E. B6rger, H. Kleine 
Biining and M.M. Richter, eds., Proc. Corwl: on Computer Science Logic 1989, Kaiserslautern, 
Germany, 1989, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 440 (Springer, Berlin, 1990). 
[41] A. Pnueli, Specification and development of reactive systems, in: H.-J. Kugler, ed., Information 
Processing (IFIP'86), (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986) 845-858. 
[42] M.M. Richter and M.E. Szabo, Nonstandard computation theory, in: J. Demetrovics, (3. Katona 
and A. Salomaa, eds., Algebra, Combinatorics, and Logic in Computer Science, Proc. Conf., (3)'iir, 
Hungary, 1983, Colloq. Math. Soc. J. Bolyai 42 (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986) 667-693. 
[43] I. Sain, There are general rules for specifying semantics: Observations on Abstract Model Theory, 
Computational Linguistics and Computcr Languages Xlll (1979) 195-250. 
[44] I. Sain, Total correctness in nonstandard dynamic logic, Bull. Se('tion Logic (Wroclaw-L6dz) 12(2) 
(1983) 64-70. 
[45] I. Sain, Structural nonstandard dynamic logic, Z. Math. Logik (3randlagen Math. 30 (1984) 481-497. 
[46] I. Sain, A simple proof fol completeness of Floyd method, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 35 (1985) 345-348. 
[47] I. Sain, Relative program verifying powers of the various temporal logics, Preprint No 40/1985, 
Math. Inst. Hungar. Acad. Sci. (An extended abstract of this is [48]), 1985. 
[48] I. Sain, The reasoning powers of Burstall's (modal logic) and Pnueli's (temporal logic) program 
verification methods, in: R. Parikh, ed., Logics ¢!f Program.~, Proc. Conf. Brooklyn, USA, 1985, Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science 193 (Springer, Berlin, 1985) 302-319. 
[49] I. Sain, Nonstandard logics of programs, Dissertation, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 
1986 (in Hungarian). 
[ 50] I. Sain, Total correctness of nonstandard logics of programs, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 50 (1987) 285-32 I. 
[51] I. Sain, An elementary proof for some semantic characterizations of nondeterministic FIoyd-Hoare 
logic, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 30 (4) (1989) 153-160. 
[52] I. Sain, Comparing and characterizing the power of established program verification methods, in: 
J. Tucker, ed., Man), Sorted Logic and its Applications (Proc. Conf. Leeds, UK) (1988) to appear. 
[54] I. Sain, Temporal logics need their clocks, Preprint, Math. Inst. Hungar. Acad. Sci., 1989; Fl~eoret. 
Comput. Sci. 95 (1992) to appear. 
[55] I. Sain, Computer science temporal logics need clocks, in: Abstracts of the AMS (1989). 
[56] I. Sain, Computer science temporal logics need their clocks, Bul:. Section Logic (Wroclaw-L6dz) 
Ig (4) (1989) 153-160. 
Temporal .nroqf~ 151 
References added in proof 
[57] H. Andr~ka, I. N~meti and I. Sain, Completeness problems in verification of programs and program 
schemes, in: J. Be~,vdr, ed., /)rot'. Conf. on Mathematical Foundation~ of Computer Science "79, 
Olomouc, Czechoslovakia, 1979, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 74 (Sprin~er, Berlin, 1979) 
208-218. 
[58] L. Csirmaz, Induction and Peano models, DI MACS Tech. Repc-t 90-28, Dept. of Computer Science, 
Rutgers Univ., 1990. 
[59] J. Kraji~ek, Letter to the present authors, 1989. 
[60] I. Sain, Past proves more invariance properties but not pca's, in: J. Dassaw and J. Kelemen, eds., 
Aspects and Prospects of Theoretical Computer Science, Proc. 6th Internat. Meeting of Young Computer 
Scientists, Smolenice, Czechoslovakia, 1990, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 464 (Springer, 
Berlin, 1990) 80-92. 
